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Returning Individual Research Results:
What Role Should People’s Preferences
Play?
Lisa S. Parker, PhD*
INTRODUCTION: FACTS AND VALUES, PREFERENCES
AND POLICY
Asking what role people’s preferences should play in policies regarding the return of biobank research results is a specific case of asking what role facts should play in prescriptions
governing action. Since Scottish Enlightenment philosopher
David Hume articulated the point, it has been generally recognized that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.”1 Nevertheless, it is also generally and correctly assumed that facts matter for prescriptions. They occasion or motivate the
development of policy as, for example, the revelation of Nazi
atrocities committed in the name of research-motivated the development of the Nuremburg Code. They also constrain policies
as prescriptive guides to action are constrained by what is actually, factually possible—“ought” implies or assumes “can,” as
philosophers say.2 And, they inform policy as when facts about
burdens of various research protocols, for example, are used to
develop criteria for assessing an appropriate balance of burdens
and potential benefits. Finally, a primary point of ethical, legal,
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1. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton
& Mary J. Norton eds., 2007).
2. Robert Stern, Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?,
16 UTILITAS 42, 42 (2004).
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and regulatory prescriptions is to protect and promote the interests of people and to fulfill their needs. Facts about those interests and needs are therefore fundamentally relevant to policy development. Moreover, if in fact no one actually embraced a
particular prescriptive policy, there would be no will to follow
or enforce it.
To determine what role people’s preferences should play in
policies regarding the return of biobank research results will
involve examining how people’s preferences regarding research
results motivate development of a policy regarding their return;
what is and can be known about people’s relevant preferences;
and the relationship between people’s preferences and interests, including those served by research and the policies governing it. Put succinctly, I will examine what we mean when
we talk about taking people’s preferences seriously, as when an
article about communicating results states: “Participants’ desires do not necessarily determine policy, but respect for participants requires taking their preferences seriously.”3 In the first
section, I discuss some generally agreed upon assumptions in
the debate about returning results. In the second, I present an
overview of the empirical research conducted to assess people’s
preferences about returning results. The third section focuses
on people’s preferences—what they are and whether they can
be used to inform research policy. Here I also raise some problems with relying on people’s preferences, but suggest the ways
in which they must be taken seriously and a context in which
they are decisive. In light of this analysis, in the final section, I
examine some of the normative arguments employed to support
return of individualized results of biorepository research.
I. UNCONTROVERSIAL ASSUMPTIONS
This inquiry begins by discussing some largely uncontroversial assumptions. First, the responsibility of investigators to
publicize aggregate results of their research is well established.
Investigators ought to publish their results in the professional
literature so that other scientists may seek to replicate and
build upon their findings. Moreover, they ought to make their
findings available and intelligible to the public, and especially

3. David I. Shalowitz & Franklin G. Miller, Communicating the Results
of Clinical Research to Participants: Attitudes, Practices, and Future Directions, 5 PLOS MED. 714, 717 (2008).
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to the population that participated in or contributed to the research. Doing so contributes to general scientific literacy, increases awareness of the benefits and limits of scientific research, and recognizes the contribution made by subjects. This
inquiry, therefore, focuses on the more controversial issue of
disclosure of nonaggregate, individual results of research
(IRRs).
Moreover, when speaking of the “disclosure” of IRRs, what
is meant is the disclosure of IRRs to the individual him/herself,
or alternatively to his/her physician or designee. Other disclosure of such personal information—on the nightly news, to a
body concerned with presidential nominees’ health, or to life insurance underwriters or other third parties—is obviously not
contemplated, though the possible access of others to individuals’ personal information following initial disclosure to them is
worth consideration.
Second, in asking about the role of people’s preferences in
return of IRRs, it is really the offer to return individual results
that is under consideration, although for ease and concision,
the shorthand “return of” is sometimes substituted. It is agreed
that in almost no case would it be appropriate to supply or impose information without first determining that an individual
wants to receive it.4 When an offer of a particular result is actually made, the individual’s expressed preference (i.e., choice
or decision) to receive it (or not) is generally decisive for reasons discussed at the end of Section three.
Third, the question here is what role people’s preferences
should play in policy development, specifically in policies regarding whether and how to offer return of IRRs. Because the
nature of both the results and the research is relevant for such
policy development, the inquiry here is restricted to the focus of
this volume: genomic research using biobanked materials and
associated data. Furthermore, the focus is on policies governing
individual research results, not incidental findings, although
admittedly the line between these is blurry in the case of genomic biobank research which is not hypothesis driven.5 The

4. One group of commentators states genetic information should never be
given to a research participant who does not want it. See Laura M. Beskow et
al., Informed Consent for Population-Based Research Involving Genetics, 286
JAMA 2315, 2320 (2001).
5. Where there are no specific aims, it is perhaps impossible to distinguish incidental findings (that are beyond the aims of the study) from individual research results. In such large-scale discovery research, perhaps the only
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distinction is raised here primarily to acknowledge that for
some types of biobank research, policies may differ with regard
to offering individual research results versus incidental findings. Nevertheless, many of the considerations raised herein
are relevant to considering policies governing return of IRRs
from research with different designs, or where the finding is actually an incidental finding (i.e., a finding not responsive to the
study’s aims).
Fourth, to be a candidate for return, a genomic IRR must
have analytic and clinical validity, i.e., both the genetic variation and the associated phenotype must be reliably identified.
It is generally, though not uniformly, agreed that unreliable results ought not be offered back to individuals. Establishing clinical validity is more challenging than establishing analytic validity, because reported associations between genetic variation
and phenotype are often not consistently replicated.6 Moreover,
when the mechanism of action or the functional relationship
between genotype and phenotype remain largely unknown, that
understanding cannot serve to bolster the clinical validity of a
genomic finding. Thus determination of the reliability, and consequently the potential reportability, of a genomic IRR partly
depends on the state of scientific understanding in particular
domains (e.g., cancer versus psychiatric genetics), as well as
the stability of the result through replication attempts. Some
IRRs from research involving biorepositories, however, may be
well-characterized polymorphisms.
Finally, the offer must comply with applicable laws. Specifically, the result must have been generated in—or verified in—
a CLIA-certified laboratory, as per the Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), in order to be offered
back to individuals.7 Although some commentators suggest
there is uncertainty about how to handle an IRR when no test
exists to enable replication of the result in a CLIA-certified laboratory prior to returning it to an individual,8 the law seems

findings that can be termed truly incidental are those identified upon baseline
screening or determination of eligibility of biobanked material and data.
6. Joel N. Hirschhorn et al., A Comprehensive Review of Genetic Association Studies, 4 GENETICS MED. 45, 49–50 (2002).
7. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.3 (2011).
8. Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic Research Results to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION:
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clear: only laboratories that “do not report patient specific results for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of any disease
or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of individual
patients” are exempt from CLIA requirements.9
II. RESEARCH ON PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES: FROM
DIVERSITY COMES APPARENT CONSENSUS
For the past decade, findings from multiple studies of people’s preferences regarding the return of research results have
been used to motivate, inform, and justify policy recommendations regarding return of IRRs.10 These studies vary across a
number of dimensions.11 Without attempting a comprehensive
review, this section highlights some of the variation in these
studies, as well as some of their major findings that are cited to
suggest there is substantial consensus regarding return of
IRRs. This section provides content and context for the analysis
of preferences that follows.
In studies of people’s preferences regarding return of results, participants were asked about receiving aggregate (or
summary) results,12 individualized results,13 or both.14 ReceivCARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 576–77 (2010).
9. Ellen Wright Clayton, Sharing Individual Research Results with
Biospecimen Contributors: Counterpoint, 21 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY,
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 260, 261 (2012) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(3)
(2011)).
10. See Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 714 (presenting a narrative
review of twenty-eight empirical studies and discussing the many dimensions
of these studies).
11. Id.
12. E.g., Ann H. Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating in Clinical
Trials Want to Know Study Results?, 95 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 491, 491 (2003)
[hereinafter Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating]; Ann H. Partridge et
al., Offering Participants Results of a Clinical Trial: Sharing Results of a Negative Study, 365 LANCET 963, 963–64 (2005) [hereinafter Partridge et al., Offering Participants Results]; Charlene J. Schulz et al., Impact on Survivors of
Retinoblastoma When Informed of Study Results on Risk of Second Cancers, 41
MED. & PEDIATRIC ONCOLOGY 36, 38 (2003).
13. E.g., Juli Bollinger, Joan Scott & David Kaufman, Public Preferences
Regarding the Return of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a
Qualitative Focus Group Study, 14 GENETICS MED. (forthcoming 2012) (e-pub
at 1); Kurt D. Christensen et al., Disclosing Individual CDKN2A Research Results to Melanoma Survivors: Interest, Impact, and Demands on Researchers,
20 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION, 522, 522–23 (2011);
Paul R. Helft & Christopher K. Daugherty, Are We Taking Without Giving in
Return? The Ethics of Research-Related Biopsies and the Benefits of Clinical
Trial Participation, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 4793, 4793–94 (2006); David
Kaufman et al., Subjects Matter: A Survey of Public Opinions About a Large
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ing aggregate results may have been conceived as involving receipt of a letter or newsletter,15 having access to a study website,16 or reporting results in public media.
The issue of receiving individualized results may have been
conceptualized as being invited to request such results,17 and/or
being offered individualized findings, including those of unknown significance,18 or only findings of apparent significance
(usually clinical or health-related significance).19 The offer and
subsequent disclosure of IRRs could be envisioned as occurring
in person;20 by letter, email, or phone;21 by the individual accessing a study website;22 or by some combination of these
methods (e.g., email notification that one may access an IRR
available on a secure website); or the policy could be that IRRs

Genetic Cohort Study, 10 GENETICS MED. 831, 835 (2008); Fiona Alice Miller,
Robin Zoe Hayeems & Jessica Peace Bytautas, What Is a Meaningful Result?
Disclosing the Results of Genomic Research in Autism to Research Participants, 18 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 867, 867–68 (2010); Juli Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort Genetic Research, AM.
J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2008, at 36, 38; M.P.M. Richards et al., Issues of Consent
and Feedback in a Genetic Epidemiological Study of Women with Breast Cancer, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 93, 93 (2003); Dave Wendler & Ezekiel Emanuel, The
Debate over Research on Stored Biological Samples: What Do Sources Think?,
162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1457, 1457 (2002).
14. E.g., Laura M. Beskow & Sondra J. Smolek, Prospective Biorepository
Participants’ Perspectives on Access to Research Results, 4 J. EMPIRICAL RES.
ON HUM. RES. ETHICS, Sept. 2009, at 99, 100; Jasper Bovenberg et al., Always
Expect the Unexpected: Legal and Social Aspects of Reporting Biobank Research Results to Individual Research Participants, CENTRE FOR SOC’Y &
GENOMICS, Nov. 2009, at 1, 8–11.
15. See, e.g., Partridge et al., Offering Participants Results, supra note 12,
at 963; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 36–38.
16. E.g., Richards et al., supra note 13, at 96.
17. Id. at 93–94; Ellen J. Steinbart et al., Impact of DNA Testing for Early-Onset Familial Alzheimer Disease and Frontotemporal Dementia, 58
ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1828, 1828 (2001).
18. Miller, Hayeems, & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 868–69; Murphy et al.,
supra note 13, at 39; Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1457–59.
19. Kaufman et al., supra note 13, at 837–38; Richards et al., supra note
13, at 94.
20. Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93; Steinbart et al., supra note 17, at
1829.
21. Christensen et al., supra, note 13, at 523; Partridge et al., Offering
Participants Results, supra note 12, at 963.
22. Though not reporting an empirical study, this model is proposed under
the Informed Cohort research regime. Isaac S. Kohane et al., Reestablishing
the Researcher-Patient Compact, 316 SCI. 836, 836 (2007).
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were not to be returned.23 The results in question may have
been (actually or hypothetically) from a clinical trial or intervention research (perhaps with a placebo control) where either
aggregate or individualized results could have relevance for
continued clinical care for the condition under study;24 from a
disease-specific epidemiological study;25 from disease-specific
genomic research;26 from either hypothesis-driven or discovery
research on materials from a disease-specific or populationbased biorepository.27
The people whose preferences were sought may have been
enrolled in a clinical trial or other clinical research,28 diseaseaffected (or parents of disease-affected children),29 at increased
risk for a condition,30 part of a non-disease specific patient population,31 representative of “the public,”32 or some combination
of these populations. They may have been asked to make an actual choice about receiving results (aggregate or individual-

23. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 101–04.
24. Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating, supra note 12, at 491; Partridge et al., Offering Participants Results, supra note 12, at 963–64.
25. Christensen et al., supra, note 13, at 522; Richards et al., supra note
13, at 93; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 36.
26. Miller, Hayeems, & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867–68; Steinbart et
al., supra note 17, at 1828.
27. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99; Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman,
supra note 13, at 1−2; Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 8; Kaufman et al, supra note 13, at 831; Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 36–37; Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1458. As Knoppers and Laberge note, there are important differences with regard to participants, their expectations, and the
nature of findings between hypothesis-driven and discovery research, and
across studies involving general or disease-specific biorepositories, or largecohort studies. Bartha Maria Knoppers & Claude Laberge, Return of “Accurate” and “Actionable” Results: Yes!, AM. J. BIOETHICS, June–July 2009, at
107, 108.
28. Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating, supra note 12, at 491; Partridge et al., Offering Patients Results, supra note 12, at 963; Wendler &
Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1457.
29. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 523; Helft & Daugherty, supra
note 13, at 4793; Miller, Hayeems & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867; Richards
et al., supra note 13, at 93; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 37.
30. Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 37; Steinbart et al., supra note17, at
1828.
31. Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 9 (also surveyed biobank researchers regarding their preferences to communicate results or not); Wendler &
Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1457.
32. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 100; Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman,
supra note 13, at 1−2; Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 9; Kaufman et al.,
supra note 13, at 831; Murphy et al, supra note 13, at 38.
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ized),33 presented with a hypothetical vignette(s) or scenario(s),34 or asked direct questions designed to elicit their preferences (e.g., about return of different types of results and/or
method of doing so).35 The study may have involved a survey,36
interviews,37 focus groups,38 mixed methods research, or—
relatively rarely—may have reported actual choices regarding
offer of return and degrees of satisfaction with the choice.39
What appears rather consistent across most of these studies is the finding that a substantial proportion of people express
a desire for receiving research results. In a summary of ten
studies reporting participants’ preferences regarding receipt of
aggregate results, “a median of 90% (range 20–100%) wished to
receive study results.”40 The same summary reported that 67–
100% of participants from 9 studies would want to receive
IRRs.41 The number of participants in these studies, employing
a range of qualitative and quantitative methods, ranged from
13 to 8491.42 For example, in a genetic epidemiological study of
women with breast cancer, 93% of 1484 participants indicated
that they “would like to be informed if [the investigators] find
something” that “may indicate that members of [their] family
might have an increased risk of developing breast cancer.”43
33. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 523; Partridge et al., Offering Patients Results, supra note 12, at 963; Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93;
Steinbart et al., supra note 17, at 1828.
34. Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 24−25; Helft & Daugherty, supra
note 13, at 4793; Murphy et al, supra note 13, at 38−39; Wendler & Emanuel,
supra note 13, at 1458.
35. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 100; Kaufman et al, supra note
13, at 832; Miller, Hayeems & Bytautas, supra note 13, at 868; Partridge et
al., Do Patients Participating, supra note 12, at 491.
36. Bovenberg et al., supra note 14, at 24-25; Helft & Daugherty, supra
note 13, at 4793; Kaufman et al, supra note 13, at 832; Partridge et al., Do Patients Participating, supra note 12, at 491; Partridge et al., Offering Patients
Results, supra note 12, at 963; Schulz et al., supra note12, at 37; Steinbart et
al., supra note 17, at 1829; Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 13, at 1458.
37. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 100; Miller, Hayeems &
Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867; Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93.
38. Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 2; Miller, Hayeems &
Bytautas, supra note 13, at 867; Murphy et al, supra note 13, at 38.
39. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 523; Richards et al., supra note
13, at 93; Schulz et al., supra note 12, at 38.
40. Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 714.
41. Id. at 715.
42. Id.
43. Richards et al., supra note 13, at 93.
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Beyond this summary, in a pilot study of offering IRRs to
participants in a genetic epidemiology study of melanoma survivors, nineteen of twenty-seven (seventy percent) participants
who were recontacted and offered their individual CDKN2A
gene test result chose to receive it.44 In contrast, only 21 of 251
(8.4%) of those at 50% risk for early-onset frontotemporal dementia requested individual testing (with return of results and
counseling) following receipt of results reporting genetic findings in the family.45 This difference in level of interest suggests
a common theme: especially among those at increased risk for a
specific condition, genomic results are most welcome when the
condition is treatable or preventable.
Reporting on forty prospective contributors to a
biorepository, another study found that “over 75% of interviewees thought researchers should provide access to at least some
kinds of individual results. At the same time, almost 75% said
they would not expect to get individual results, based on their
understanding of the consent form. . . .”46 Investigators in Amsterdam conducted a questionnaire study, using nine fictitious
genetic risk results, to assess preferences for IRR return among
two populations: patients who had consented to research involving banking of tissue and citizens.47 For all nine fictitious
IRRs, which varied as to associated condition and type of information (e.g., disease risk or pharmacogenomic), seventy to
seventy-eight percent of citizens and patients would prefer to
receive the results.48 Citizens preferred receipt slightly more
than patients.49
Though this is not a comprehensive analysis, it provides
evidence that when people are asked about their preference, a
substantial proportion express a desire or preference for receiving IRRs. As investigators in the Amsterdam study point out,
however, a “sizeable minority” do not.50 A focus group study
found, in fact, a “small group remained adamantly opposed to
the return of any IRRs, citing that returning IRRs was not the
intent of the study and that the cost to do so could negatively

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 524.
Steinbart et al., supra note 17, at 1828.
Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 108.
Bovenberg et al, supra note 14, at 231.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 232.
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affect the research.”51
Nevertheless, it is this apparent consensus of empirical
findings that has fueled an “emerging consensus” that at least
some IRRs should be returned.52 That people’s preferences warrant return of individual results of biorepository research
(IRBRs) is a conclusion proffered as part of this empiricallydriven normative trend. If it is so clear that at least the majority of people want to be offered IRRs, then why should there be
any question about recommending and devising policies to do
so? The problem is that there are problems with preferences.
III. PROBLEMS WITH EMPLOYING PEOPLE’S
PREFERENCES IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Given that so many people apparently want to receive
IRRs, why shouldn’t that fact be decisive, or at least a primary
factor, in developing a research policy? In an enterprise where
the goal is preference satisfaction, people’s individual preferences should play a huge role. In ethics, if our view of the Good
were preference satisfaction—not, for example, a hedonistic
view or a substantive view of the Good—then people’s preferences would be supremely important. Their satisfaction would
be valuable, indeed the value. On such a view, satisfying people’s preferences would be the right thing to do because preference satisfaction is good, indeed the Good.
But the goal of research is not preference satisfaction; indeed that is not even the goal of public health or clinical care,
which are sometimes blurred with or taken to be the overarching enterprises of which health research is a part.53 Instead,
51. Bollinger, Scott & Kaufman, supra note 13, at 6.
52. Anneline L. Bredenoord et al., Disclosure of Individual Genetic Data to
Research Participants: The Debate Reconsidered, 27 TRENDS GENETICS 41, 45
(2011); Michelle N. Meyer, The Kindness of Strangers: The Donative Contract
Between Subjects and Researchers and the Non-Obligation to Return Individual Results of Genetic Research, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2008, at 44, 44. It
might also be added that if the research context, type of results, and characteristics of study population matter for reliable assessment of people’s preferences, relatively few studies have replicated preference results while employing the same set of study variables.
53. Christian Munthe, The Goals of Public Health: An Integrated Multidimensional Model, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 39, 40 (2008) (listing the goals of
public health as the promotion of population health, addressing concerns with
the distribution of health within a society, and promoting individual and autonomous health opportunities); Ann Nevin, Visiting Professor, Fla. Int’l Univ.
& Professor Emerita, Ariz. State Univ., Keynote Address for Barry Univ. 2006
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the increase of generalizable knowledge is the goal of research,
though its activities are constrained and informed by the possibility of that knowledge having social value, which must itself
be informed by some account of what is good/the Good.54 The
goal of public health and clinical medicine is health, which itself contributes to people’s well-being.55 Few people would embrace a preference satisfaction view of well-being, though arguing against it is well beyond the scope of this inquiry. It may be
enough to recall an occasion when one’s preference was based
on mistaken beliefs and its satisfaction did not, therefore, make
one better off.
Even if preference satisfaction is not the goal, however,
there may be reasons to take people’s preferences into account
in developing policies regarding IRBRs.56 Yet, there are also
reasons militating against basing such policies on preferences.57 To understand why people’s preferences may not be the
best motivation for development of policies to return IRBRs, or
the best informational source for doing so, one must first examine what preferences are and their relationship to people’s beliefs, decisions, behaviors, and interests in general.58 Then one
can specifically examine people’s IRR-related preferences, beliefs, and behaviors to determine the proper role of preferences
in policies regarding IRBRs.
A. WHAT PREFERENCES ARE
“Preference” can have at least three different meanings in

Research Conference: Why Do “We” “Do Research?”(Jan. 21, 2006) , available
at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED492638.pdf (noting that to meet the needs
of children, teachers, and classrooms; to fulfill personal needs because of other
people; and to add to the knowledge base are common responses to “why do
you do research?”).
54. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David Wendler & Christine Grady, What
Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA 2701, 2701 (2000).
55. See id. at 2703.
56. See, e.g., Daniel M. Hausman, Valuing Health, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
246, 257−59 (2006) (surveying arguments for and against relying on preferences to compare and value health states, and recognizing that reliance on
preferences may be advocated “by arguing . . . that the variety of circumstances, aims, and values makes it impossible to construct a general theory of goodness of health states and . . . that it is offensive to disregard the evaluations of
individuals, even though they may sometimes be badly off the mark.”).
57. Id.
58. Id. For the account that follows, I am indebted to the work of Daniel
Hausman, as well as to conversation with Marcus Adams, though I assume
responsibility for any misunderstandings or errors in reasoning.
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ordinary usage.59 One can use “prefer” to refer to choice per se,
as when one responds to the person scooping gelato, saying “I
prefer the chocolate.”60 Perhaps this usage contributes to the
belief that people’s preferences can be “read off of” their choices.
Yet, in a common way of understanding choices and preferences, that one chose chocolate may not reveal one’s flavor
preference. One may have preferred the dulce de leche, but
chocolate was on sale and having left one’s wallet at home, one
can only scrape together coins to meet the sale price. In this
case, one’s preference for dulce de leche employs the second
meaning of preference: liking.61 Preference is not mere liking,
however, but comparative liking.
In its third usage, preference reflects a comparative evaluation or judgment of which is the better choice, as when even
though I prefer (i.e., more greatly like the taste of) dulce de
leche, I judge the chocolate to be better to purchase and eat.62
In my overall comparative evaluation, I may consider that I
like both to some degree, though I like dulce de leche better;
that I believe chocolate to have some health benefits lacking in
dulce de leche; and that the chocolate in question is a Fair
Trade product. The latter two considerations outweigh my
greater liking of dulce de leche, leading to my preference for the
chocolate. Still, if I have given up chocolate for Lent, this factor
may compete with my preferences to influence my choice. Although this factor could be explained as influencing my choice
by influencing my preferences—“she prefers to fulfill the obligations of her religion, rather than to eat chocolate”—this factor seems more naturally described as a constraint on my preferences or as competing with them.
It is this third meaning of preference as comparative evaluation that seems most relevant to considering research results. Such preferences are not mere “gut feeling” likings or desires, but are more cognitively complex in two ways. First, they
are comparative.63 Second, they are influenced by beliefs.64 In
the previous example, my beliefs about the health benefits and
59. Daniel M. Hausman, Mistakes About Preferences in the Social Sciences, 41 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 3, 7 (2011).
60. Cf. id. at 5 (preferring tuna to salmon).
61. See id. at 5−6.
62. Cf. id. at 6 (comparing sorbet and cheesecake for dessert).
63. See Hausman, supra note 56, at 254.
64. See id. at 260.
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the Fair Trade status of the chocolate influenced my preference
for it. Preferences are comparative judgments that rank states
of affairs about which people have preferences conditioned on
beliefs. A person’s preference that investigators inform her of
clinically significant IRBRs might be conditioned on her belief
that learning clinically significant genomic information will
prompt her to engage in preventive health behaviors or to inform her offspring of increased health risks.
B. EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS LURKING BEHIND PREFERENCES
As comparative evaluations, preferences are plagued by
particular epistemic problems. They may be based, in part, on
false beliefs.65 In the gelato example,66 it may be the case that
unbeknownst to me, the particular chocolate supplier has actually lost its Fair Trade certification for violating child labor
standards, or the particular chocolate has been Dutch processed, which allegedly reduces its health benefits. Had I been
better informed, I would have had different beliefs and, consequently, a different preference between the two gelato options.67
Several of the studies of people’s preferences regarding return of IRRs—indeed, some studies reporting that a high proportion prefer receiving them68—also reported that people held
various false beliefs.69 Though people’s beliefs relevant to return of IRRs have not been studied as extensively as their preferences, there is evidence that people do in fact frequently have
several false beliefs.70 Of prospective biorepository contributors
65. Hausman, supra note 59, at 17–18.
66. See supra Part 3.A.
67. See also Hausman, supra note 59, at 18 (noting that there is never an
exact one-to-one correlation between choices and preferences because of the
different reasoning behind those choices).
68. E.g., Kaufman et al., supra note 13, at 836–38 (“Public eagerness for
genetic information is unsurprising in an environment where genetic research
is widely believed to be beneficial . . . .”).
69. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99, 102−03; see also Conrad Fernandez, Public Expectations for Return of Results—Time to Stop Being Paternalistic?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2008, at 46, 47 (explaining the possible considerations of researchers); David C. Landy et al., How Disease Advocacy
Organizations Participate in Clinical Research: A Survey of Genetic
Organizations, 14 GENETICS MED. (forthcoming 2012) (e-pub at 5) (detailing
the beliefs that underpin the medical philosophy of disease advocacy
organizations).
70. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 102–03 (noting that patients did
not understand the different obligations for researchers and physicians); see
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drawn from a general, geographically-defined population, forty
percent had somewhat mistaken views of differences in
knowledge between investigators and their personal physicians:
Some felt that their physician would already have discovered any
problems with their health, expressing doubt that research results
would represent information their physician did not already know.
Others, however, thought researchers might have more or newer
knowledge than their physician would have, and gave this as a reason
they should get individual results.71

The first belief is largely mistaken given the types of research to be undertaken, and the disease susceptibility information that may be discovered using biobanked materials. The
second belief may be false, given the relevance of examining
family and personal medical history and environmental components in order to interpret the significance of many genomic
findings, even though researchers are more likely than physicians to have a current understanding of particular genetic variations.72 In addition, “many interviewees seemed to assume
that individual research results would relate to a currently diagnosable, yet undetected condition,” saying things such as:
Give me any kind of information that would help me along. If I had
cancer, I sure wouldn’t want to go two or three years and they know it
and I don’t know it. Give it [the results] to me.
Regardless of what they find out, whatever kind of diseases they find
out that I have, I would want to know about it.. . .
. . . [I]f they found out that, God forbid, I might have a tumor or cancer building up and I don’t know it and I’m thinking I’m healthy, I
think they should get in touch with somebody. Like send me a letter: .
. . [W]e found some cancer on you or . . . you know, you might not be
living that much longer.73

This apparent misunderstanding of biorepository research
as discovering active, present disease conditions in individuals
also Kaufman et al., supra note 13, at 836–38 (noting that potential clinical
trial participants would like their data even if it was of little or no value, in
part because of the perceived importance of genetic testing in modern medicine).
71. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 103.
72. See Brian H. Shirts & Lisa S. Parker, Changing Interpretations, Stable Genes: Responsibilities of Patients, Professionals, and Policy Makers in the
Clinical Interpretation of Complex Genetic Information, 10 GENETICS MED.
778, 778 (2008) (“[C]omplex genetic traits usually involve [the] interaction of
multiple genes and environmental factors. Understanding genetic risk for
complex genetic traits has been much more challenging than expected.”).
73. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 69, at 104.
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linked to stored materials—rather than associations between
genotype and (perhaps present) disease, or between genotype
and increased risk for disease—perhaps explains why some
participants believed their physicians would already have discovered any problems with their health that might be revealed
through biorepository research.74
In one survey of individuals who had either contributed
materials to biorepositories or were Medicare recipients, 88.8%
said they would want to be “informed of results of uncertain
clinical significance,” prompting study investigators to comment: “Future research should assess whether respondents’ desire for research results of uncertain clinical significance reflects a lack of appreciation for the difference between clinically
validated tests and research assays with no proven reliability
or validity.”75 The authors advise, however, that “[i]n the meantime, researchers should be aware that the common practice of
not divulging results of uncertain significance may prove upsetting to many research participants.”76 Indeed in a paper summarizing findings from eighteen studies regarding participant
preferences, the results of this study (88.8% desire receipt of
IRRs of uncertain significance) are considered alongside affirmative responses regarding desire for reliable, clinically significant results as evidence supporting the growing consensus
that people prefer to receive IRRs.77
Another study focused not on individuals’ beliefs about receiving results, but on the effect of investigators generating individualized genetic results on individuals’ desires for those results.78 Here the problem with the preferences might be
described as their being oddly influenced rather than their being based on false belief.79 Study participants were either participating in a longitudinal study of Alzheimer disease (AD) or
receiving clinical care for cancer (CA); all contributed biological
74. See id. at 103 (“Some felt that their physician would already have discovered any problems with their health, expressing doubt that research results would represent information their physician did not already know.”).
75. Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 13 at 1461.
76. Id.
77. Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 717 (“Available data consistently
indicate that research participants want aggregate and clinically significant
individual study results made available to them.”).
78. David Wendler & Rebecca Pentz, How Does the Collection of Genetic
Test Results Affect Research Participants?, 143A AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A
1733, 1733 (2007).
79. See id.
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samples for research purposes.80 The participants were presented with a range of hypothetical opportunities to have genetic testing to determine their chances of developing Alzheimer’s disease.81 The first two opportunities involved testing
saliva, either through a free home test kit or a test performed
by a researcher.82 After the first two options, participants were
asked: “Suppose that as part of a study in which you were involved, a researcher had already done a test on your blood, and
the researcher knew your chances of developing Alzheimer’s
disease. How likely is it that you would want to know the results?”83
Only thirty-six percent of AD and forty-two percent of CA
participants reported being very likely to use the home test kit,
and only forty-six percent of CA participants were very likely to
ask a researcher to perform the test (the AD participants were
not asked).84 In contrast, sixty-four percent of AD and seventyfour percent of CA participants were “very likely” to want to
know the result if the researcher knew it.85 Combining those
that answered “very likely” and “somewhat likely” to want to
know if the researcher knew, the proportions rose to seventyeight percent of AD and ninety percent of CA participants.86
Asked directly “[h]ow would the fact that the researcher knew
your results already affect your wish to know your results?,”
40% of the CA cohort responded that it would greatly or somewhat increase their interest.87 Asked as an open-ended question, members of the AD cohort indicated that the existence of
the test result, or the fact that the researcher or another person
knew their test result, would increase their desire to know the
result as well.88 These results do not, of course, indicate false

80. Id. at 1734 (“[P]atients were asked to contribute to research any remaining tissue that was not needed for their clinical care.”).
81. Id.
82. Id. (explaining that participants were first asked about utilizing a
home test kit before being asked about taking a test that involved a researcher).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1734−35.
85. Id. at 1735. “Very likely” represented the highest level of enthusiasm
to receive results. Id. at 1374–75.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1734, 1736.
88. Id. at 1736.
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beliefs.89 They indicate reasons that, at least in the hypothetical context described, people would choose to learn a genomic
result. These might be considered reasons that compete with
the individuals’ preferences to influence choice (I would prefer
not to know, but since you do . . .), or they might be considered
to influence the preferences directly. However they are thought
to affect preferences, the fact that someone else knows the information appears to influence individuals’ hypothetical choices
regarding acquiring the information themselves.90 Whether or
not this is a good reason—and whether it is itself grounded in
accurate or erroneous beliefs—it is not a health-related reason
for learning the information, or even a reason related to personal or reproductive planning.
One health-related false belief did emerge from this study.
“A small number of research participants indicated that the
fact the researcher knew their test result would decrease their
desire to know it: ‘The investigator could keep me informed
about what might help or affect me.’”91 This false belief is a
classic case of therapeutic misconception. A similar misconception was also evident in a study of beliefs and attitudes of those
donating samples for genetic research, where a large percentage did not distinguish between research and diagnostic testing.92 In yet another study, forty-two percent of clinical research participants agreed that results from a research biopsy
would “influence their health and care,” while another fifteen
percent agreed that the biopsy may or may not do so.93
Clearly it is problematic to ground policy regarding offer of
IRBRs in people’s preferences if those preferences are often
based on false beliefs.94 Many of the studies assessing people’s
preferences have not examined the beliefs on which their preferences are based, so the prevalence of false beliefs is not currently known.
The obvious not-so-quick fix for those who believe prefer-

89. Id. at 1737 (“Many respondents attributed this effect to the fact that
they did not want investigators to possess genetic information about them that
they did not possess.”).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1736.
92. Marsha Michie et al., “If I Could in a Small Way Help”: Motivations
for and Beliefs About Sample Donation for Genetic Research, 6 J. EMPIRICAL
RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS, June 2011, at 57, 67.
93. Helft & Daugherty, supra note 13, at 4794.
94. See Hausman, supra note 56, at 261.
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ences should motivate and inform policy development is to
specify that when evaluating policy options in light of people’s
preferences, policy makers should attend to “rational or informed preferences,” not those that are merely manifest.95 But,
“[s]hifting from actual to informed preference limits the significance of preference.”96 Relying on informed, or corrected preferences, shifts attention from people’s actual preferences to the
options or states of affairs that make their preferences appropriate or worth taking into account.97 By introducing a notion
of appropriate or corrected preferences, a direct normative
evaluation of the options is smuggled in.98
Rather than assessing people’s preferences, policy makers
might better evaluate directly those options or states of affairs
of which people’s preferences are comparative evaluations.99 In
enquiring about people’s preferences, researchers are asking
people’s opinions of matters of fact, when “they should instead
be trying to find out what the facts are” and evaluating those
facts directly.100 After all, if people in general can form comparative evaluations of the options available regarding IRRs, policy makers can do so as well.101 But if the options are more complex than preferring chocolate to vanilla,102 even the majority
that prefers one option will likely prefer it for a variety of different reasons, influenced by a variety of different beliefs.103
Therefore, the majority’s preference is frequently not a good
guide to what is good about the preferred option.104
To develop policies regarding return of IRBRs, policy mak95. Id. at 262.
96. Id. at 263.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 262 (“[L]et informed preferences rather than manifest preferences be the standard by which health states are compared. To measure informed preferences, provide survey respondents with information . . . . Give
them time to reflect.”).
99. See Hausman, supra note 59, at 23 (“But beneath the criticism lies a
constructive thesis: that preferences in economics are subjective total evaluations that are both action-guiding and subject to rational criticism.”).
100. Hausman, supra note 56, at 265.
101. See generally id. at 262–63 (noting that sophistication barriers can be
removed by providing more information and using better questioning).
102. See supra Part 3.A.
103. Hausman, supra note 59, at 20.
104. See id. (“Choice could not by itself reveal preference, because, given
the right set of beliefs, any set of choices is consistent with any set of preferences.”).
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ers—investigators, institutional review boards, or biorepository
governing bodies—should evaluate different options, different
possible states of affairs: for example, the option of offering individualized findings that meet criteria of validity and significance or offering no IRBRs that lack immediate life-saving potential. They should examine how well different options
regarding return of IRBRs achieve the reasons for returning
IRBRs—namely, whether (and to what degree) the different options regarding IRBRs further or impede important goals in research and health promotion.
C. MIGHT SATISFYING PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES NEVERTHELESS
BE A GOOD THING TO DO, OR AT LEAST A BENIGN APPROACH TO
MANAGING IRBRS?
Even if people’s preferences do not themselves constitute a
reason to offer IRBRs, might offering return of such results still
be a good thing—a nice thing to do? If offering IRBRs were
largely costless or did not have any substantial downsides, it
would seem that providing people with what they say they
want might be a prima facie good (though whether doing so actually enhances well-being is a different issue). But, developing
the infrastructure to offer back results of biorepository research
(and indeed other research) is not costless. It is not even cheap.
Few studies have attempted to establish the cost of returning a genomic research result. In one, $1,322 was the average
cost per completed disclosure.105 Of course, the details of a protocol to return results would significantly affect cost, especially
with regard to personally tailoring or standardizing informational materials, the degree of personal contact and counseling
provided, and the expense of confirming genotypes. Several
commentators have indicated that additional funding will need
to be built into research budgets—ranging from individual project budgets to those of funding agencies, foundations, and
commercial entities—if the costs of result-return activities are
not to encroach on funds for research activities themselves.106
However, none has suggested sources of such additional fund105. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 527. A few other studies also report on the costs of offering back various types of individualized results.
Shalowitz & Miller, supra note 3, at 716–17.
106. Lisa S. Parker, Rethinking Respect for Persons Enrolled in Research,
AM. SOC’Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN. EXCHANGE, Spring 2006, at 1; see also
Fernandez, supra note 69, at 47–48 (acknowledging that returning research
results will come with “financial and perhaps opportunity cost[s]”).
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ing at a time of rising costs in research and health care and
constraints on overall state and national budgets. In addition,
some commentators are beginning to raise the issue of downstream costs occasioned by return of IRBRs, particularly the
cascade of interventions such information may occasion.107 Anticipation of these costs prompts suggestions that the practice
of returning research results should be subjected to comparative effectiveness analysis.108
Moreover, as a 2009 commentary advised, “if it is to be any
benefit to health, genetic risk information needs to prompt individuals to pursue risk-reduction behaviors, yet early evidence
suggests that genetic risk may not be an effective motivator of
behavior change.”109 Variants discovered in gene-disease association studies have very small effect sizes, indicating that
common diseases are complex (i.e., involve the interaction of
multiple genes and the environment).110 Therefore, genomic
risk information may best serve as “an adjunct to current risk
assessment, refining rather than replacing other methods of
risk stratification.”111 Moreover, it is “unclear whether most
behavioral interventions can or should be individualized for
people at moderately increased risk of disease.”112 “Aggressive
prevention measures, such as prophylactic surgery, would be
ethically and socially unacceptable for people with moderately
increased risk,” while many less aggressive measures may be
pursued as general healthy behaviors (e.g., diet, exercise, and
smoking cessation), and their adoption may “have more to do
with social circumstances than with genetic risk . . . .”113 The
107. E.g., Clayton, supra note 9, at 261; Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L.
McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research,
GENETICS MED. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3), available at
http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/gim201210a.html; Amy
L. McGuire et al., Research Ethics and the Challenge of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 9 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 152, 153 (2008).
108. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 9, at 261; Clayton & McGuire, supra note
107, at 1; Nora B. Henrikson, Deborah Bowen & Wylie Burke, Does Genomic
Risk Information Motivate People to Change Their Behavior?, 1 GENOME MED.
37.1, 37.2 (2009).
109. Henrikson, Bowen & Burke, supra note 108, at 37.1.
110. Id. at 37.1–37.2.
111. Id. at 37.2.
112. Id.
113. Id. Indeed, even for individuals who are highly motivated to pursue
such prevention behaviors (i.e., who have strong preferences for doing so), social circumstances may compete with their preference to influence their actual
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commentators acknowledge that while receipt of risk information has been associated with little distress, of greatest concern “is the fact that we lack evidence that individualized risk
information is an effective motivator of behavioral change.”114
They advocate holding provision of genomic risk information to
a test of comparative effectiveness and state that “[h]ealth care
providers and funders have a responsibility to use tests with
proven health value—a standard not yet achieved for genetic
risk information intended to motivate healthy behaviors.”115
In comparison to studies of people’s preferences regarding
return of individualized genomic results, there has been little
research showing how receipt of DNA-related IRRs affects recipients’ health behaviors. In light of this paucity, studies of
what people do with genomic information of the sort that could
be reported back as IRBRs may be relevant. Unfortunately, the
sort of information that would constitute IRBRs has not had a
good track record of motivating health behaviors.
One study did report behavioral responses to return of genomic research results to melanoma survivors (a genomic IRR):
“[f]ew health behavior changes were reported at the 3-month
follow-up,” though most participants were already engaging in
prevention behaviors.116 In eleven studies that assessed the
impact of reporting a DNA-based increased risk for breast,
ovarian, or colorectal cancer or for hypercholesterolemia, an increase in risk-reducing behaviors (e.g., increased screening,
prophylactic surgery) was reported in five of them.117 In a meta-analysis of twenty-one studies examining the impact of genetic counseling on those with familial cancer risk (though admittedly not DNA-based risk information), none of the four
studies that examined behavioral impact found an increase in
surveillance behavior.118
Explanatory models accounting for these disappointing behavioral outcomes are being devised and tested, including, for
choice and behavior. This consideration thus fits with the model of preferences
discussed above.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 526.
117. Theresa M. Marteau & John Weinman, Self-Regulation and the Behavioural Response to DNA Risk Information: A Theoretical Analysis and
Framework for Future Research, 62 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1360, 1361 (2006).
118. Id.; see Dejana Braithwaite et al., Psychological Impact of Genetic
Counseling for Familial Cancer: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 96 J.
NAT’L CANCER INST. 122, 129 (2004).
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example, the hypothesis that “the provision of DNA based risk
information may fail to activate behavio[]ral responses (e.g. adherence to treatment or dietary advice) that reduce a health
threat either because a genetically based disease is perceived to
be uncontrollable or amenable only to a biological treatment, or
both.”119 This explanation moves beyond simple invocation of
fatalism to suggest that perceptions of available interventions
are also critical, as is the significance of risk reduction as a personally embraced goal.
Individuals’ own explanatory models, informationseeking/avoidance styles, and expectations are relevant to psychological impact of DNA-based results as well. In the first
randomized study directly comparing the impact of Alzheimer’s
disease risk assessment, with and without the provision of genotype information, an unfavorable genetic test result had relatively little impact on risk perception.120 Investigators explained this by hypothesizing that the majority of those tested
may have expected the unfavorable result based on family history: “[t]est results that meet expectations regardless of whether they are favorable or unfavorable have a less negative impact than test results that confound expectations.”121 There are
more studies that examine the psychological impact of receiving individualized genomic information than there are that examine the impact on behavior. A simplified but accurate summary of psychological impact studies to date may be:
unfavorable results tend to cause less distress, and favorable
results occasion less false reassurance than commentators have
feared. It must be remembered that, because of the testing contexts generating results to date, most genomic results returned
thus far were specifically sought, or at least the recipients expected their return. Among the contexts that matter for the effective return of genomic results is the context created by the
recipient’s expectations.122

119. Marteau & Weinman, supra note 117, at 1364.
120. Theresa M. Marteau et al., Predictive Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s
Disease: Impact upon Risk Perception, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 397, 400 (2005).
121. Id. at 402.
122. For a discussion of how context may affect the researcher’s obligation
to report IRBRs, see Laura M. Beskow & Wylie Burke, Commentary, Offering
Individual Genetic Research Results: Context Matters, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL
MED., June 30, 2010, at 1.
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D. MIGHT ACCEDING TO PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES WITH REGARD
TO IRBRS BE PRUDENT FOR THE SAKE OF THE RESEARCH
ENTERPRISE ITSELF?
Strong preferences about policies can affect their practicability. If, for example, people so dislike a policy regarding the
return of IRBRs that no one followed it, or if their dislike
prompted actions with negative social consequences, then practicality would require that the policy be changed. Assume for
the moment that a policy was developed that sought to curtail
any return of IRBRs, and no one preferred the policy; indeed,
everyone strongly disliked it. (Ignore issues of how it could even
come to be.) If investigators and those regulating research at
all levels strongly disliked the policy and thus refused to adhere to or enforce it, the policy would be ineffective. More likely, given the preferences reported, prospective contributors
would refuse to donate samples to biobanks. The policy would
undermine or render impossible biorepository research. Even if
the percentage of prospective contributors who refused to participate was less than 100%, a somewhat more realistic assumption, the number would likely be so high that
biorepository research would be substantially slowed (because
of substantially slower recruitment), or there would be increased risk of research bias (particularly if participation refusal were not consistent across all relevant populations). To be
enforceable and socially beneficial, policies must serve the
needs and interests of people, and must be seen to do so—or at
least cannot be viewed as doing the opposite. Policies need “buy
in.”
It is true that when specifically asked about the importance of the possibility of receiving IRBRs, a large proportion of people surveyed and interviewed indicate that this possibility serves as an incentive to their consent to participate
and/or that not being able to receive IRBRs would make them
less inclined to do so.123 Thus it may be thought that the goals
of biorepository research cannot be accomplished without satisfying the IRBR-related preferences of prospective biorepository
contributors. Indeed, commentators imply that acceding to people’s stated preference for return is warranted for the sake of
the research enterprise itself,124 even though incentives to en-

123. Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 41.
124. Ann H. Partridge & Eric P. Winer, Informing Clinical Trial Participants About Study Results, 288 JAMA 363, 363–64 (2002) (suggesting that

002 PARKER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

472

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:06 PM

[Vol. 13:2

courage participation in research that participants would otherwise not consent to are frequently discouraged, if not prohibited as undue inducements.125
Findings from four studies illustrate the nature and
strength of the IRBR-related preferences, as well as normative
conclusions being drawn from them. In the first study, researchers conducted an on-line survey to gage public willingness to participate in a large -cohort study. The most influential factor affecting the respondent’s willingness to participate
in the study seemed to be the offer of individualized results (associated with a six percent increase in the willingness to participate), as opposed to an offer of monetary compensation (an offer of $200 resulted in only a five percent increase in the
willingness to participate).126
In a second study, a genetic epidemiology study involving
melanoma survivors, of participants who were re-contacted and
offered their genetic IRRs, fifty-nine percent reported that disclosure increased the likelihood of their future participation in
research.127
In a third study, prospective biorepository contributors
were presented with the informed consent template that had
been developed for the biorepository.128 The template specified:
“You should not expect to get individual results from research
done with your blood.”129 When asked whether this statement
affected their willingness to participate, ten percent said
‘yes’.130 Over seventy-five percent of those interviewed thought
investigators should return at least some IRRs, while almost
seventy-five percent stated they understood they would not receive them based on the consent template; and, approximately
ninety percent said this fact would not affect their opinion
about participating.131

sharing results might motivate individuals to participate in clinical trials and
bolster accruals).
125. E.g., General requirements for informed consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116
(2010) (“An investigator shall seek such consent only under circumstances . . .
that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.”).
126. See Kaufman, supra note 13, at 832.
127. Christensen et al., supra note 13, at 526.
128. Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99.
129. Id. at 100.
130. Id. at 104–05.
131. Id. at 108.
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In a fourth study, investigators reported and reflected on
their focus group results:
[A]ccess to individual research results was viewed as a valuable incentive for participating in the proposed study. Because large cohort
gene-environment studies require long-term commitments from study
volunteers with few incentives in the way of direct medical benefits,
offering participants access to their personal research results may be
useful in recruiting and retaining research participants.132

They seem simultaneously to recognize the unlikelihood of
individual benefit from the return of results and to advocate
encouraging prospective repository participants to view results
as benefits for the sake of study recruitment and retention.
As if in direct response to such studies’ findings that the
possibility of learning IRBRs serves as an incentive to enrollment, other commentators note that “[t]o hold out access to undefined research results as a benefit would be a ‘dangerous
move toward encouraging the therapeutic misconception if the
results are preliminary and not validated, or their predictive
value is not well understood’.”133 Moreover, offering participants information lacking health-related value when they mistakenly believe it to be valuable should be discouraged on
grounds that is disingenuous to do so. This is especially true in
light of findings from the investigators’ focus groups that the
possibility of direct medical or at least health-related benefit is
frequently cited as a primary reason that people prefer to receive results134 and that the most preferred option would be return of results that are accurate and actionable.135
Although people report a preference for receiving IRRs (including genomic IRRs) and indicate that the possibility of receiving them increases their willingness to participate in research, when there has been no plan or promise to return
results, there is no evidence of actual widespread research participation refusal, and especially no evidence of any systematic
trends in refusals, that would raise concern about introducing
bias into biorepository research.136 Both whether and how not

132. Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 41.
133. Knoppers & Laberge, supra note 27, at 108 (quoting Mildred K. Cho,
Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and Genomics,
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 284–85 (2008)).
134. E.g., Murphy et al., supra note 13, at 39–40.
135. See, e.g., id., at 39.
136. The concern about such bias is similar to the concern expressed that
relying on “information altruists,” those “who are most willing to have their
health data publicly shared,” could create subject bias and impede the ability
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receiving IRBRs would affect recruitment for biorepository research are empirical questions that warrant further study. In
light of problems with people’s preferences identified herein, as
well as evidence—admittedly from other contexts—that preferences do not predict behavior, it would be a mistake to accede
to people’s manifest preferences for return for the sake of recruitment to biorepository research, especially without evidence
that doing so is necessary.
E. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH BASING POLICIES ABOUT
OFFERING IRBRS ON PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES
In addition to the possibility that people’s preferences may
be influenced by false beliefs, and the fact that asking about
people’s preferences is a poor way to evaluate the relationship
of those options to the goals of research, public health, and
health care, there are additional problems with trying to use
people’s preferences to inform research policy.
First, the idea of “people’s preferences” is incoherent. Individuals have preferences, but “the people” do not. We can determine what the majority of a specific population prefers, but
unless that majority is instead unanimity, we cannot infer an
individual’s preference from the majority’s preference.137 Except perhaps for a few rare cases, there is no uniform preference, unified view, or social consensus about the value or desirability of being offered IRBRs.138

of genomic research to identify genetic variation relevant to the general population. Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Policy Forum, No Longer DeIdentified, 312 SCI. 370, 371 (2006).
137. Even in a case of unanimity, if the states of affairs over which comparative evaluations are being made are themselves at all complex, individuals are likely to prefer the same option for different reasons based on different
beliefs. So again, analyzing even a unanimous preference may not reveal much
about the value of the option itself, and the unanimity of preference may be
quite unstable.
138. The strongest candidate for attracting such social consensus is, I argue, information meeting the criteria for a duty to warn articulated in
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, where such a duty was found to
hold for the individual having privileged access to credible information regarding risk of a serious, preventable harm to another. See Parker, supra note 106,
at 6 (comparing the duty to warn established in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976), with the duty of a researcher in possession of
life-saving information). Indeed, in this case it is the likelihood of being able to
prevent a serious harm (murder) that justifies warning the potential victim,
not data showing that most people would prefer to be warned.
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In practice, we are stuck with the problem of moving from
knowing data about “people’s IBRR preferences,” or the majority of people’s preferences, to learning about a specific individual’s personal preference. Facts about the majority’s preferences
do not straightforwardly reveal the preference of the particular
person who is the subject of a specific IRBR.
Ironically, those who draw the strongest connection between subjects’ preferences and researchers’ duties—by claiming that the former entail the latter—render empirical data
about preferences of minimal use. Whatever else it requires, respect for persons demands that we attend to the unique preferences of each individual. Regardless of whether empirical data
show that most subjects want results or not, as long as we
know that even one may, researchers would be obligated to offer results to all in search of that one.139
This comment both points to the incoherence and suggests
a possible way out. The suggestion is made that every individual be offered return of every IRBR, in order to ensure that
those wanting IRBRs have access.140 But, this solution will not
work, and it suggests the next set of problems.
There is a second incoherence in the case of trying to return an IRBR according to the preferences of the individual to
whom it is linked. There is no way for that individual to make
an informed decision about whether she wants to receive the
result unless she is substantially informed of the result. This
problem arises at two decision stages: during informed consent
to biobank participation and when an offer to receive an actual
IRBR is made. An individual cannot be offered the options (to
be offered/receive an IRBR or not) and make an adequately informed comparative evaluation of her options without knowing
important facts about the IRBRs that she might receive. But,
informing her of those facts risks imposing on her information
that she prefers not to receive.
Choice of an option regarding IRBR return, even in the
context of informed consent to biorepository participation, is
choice in a hypothetical context. The informed consent context
regarding IRBR management is similar to the hypothetical
scenarios used in research on likely uptake of genetic susceptibility testing.141 Indeed, the second decisional context—when

139. Meyer, supra note 52, at 45.
140. Id.
141. See Susan Persky et al., Assessing Hypothetical Scenario Methodology
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one receives an offer of a specific (but as yet unrevealed/unreturned) IRBR and must make a decision—is also
essentially a hypothetical situation.
Research on people’s preferences regarding genetic susceptibility testing frequently employs hypothetical scenarios, and
there is often a substantial gap between anticipated (based on
such research) and actual uptake of testing.142 Research on hypothetical scenario methodology suggests that, for example,
“higher intention-behavior congruence might be achieved via
consideration of temporal proximity . . .” (i.e., “the extent to
which a decision is portrayed as being immediate or having
immediate consequences”).143 While such a change in research
methodology might improve congruence between individuals’
actual behavior and the investigator-prompted expressions of
their preference, it is not clear that this amendment could improve the informed consent process regarding offers of
IRBRs.144 It would be disingenuous to suggest to a biobank contributor that the opportunity to receive an individual result is
likely to be temporally proximate, or that if eventually found
and reported, the result would have immediate consequences.
in Genetic Susceptibility Testing Analog Studies: A Quantitative Review, 9
GENETICS MED. 727, 727 (2007) (“Because GST is generally not yet available
for many common diseases, hypothetical scenario methodology has often been
used to assess testing interest and estimate upcoming need for services. This
methodology has the benefit of allowing investigators to manipulate important
test characteristics and contextual variables to understand better how these
factors influence reported interest levels and intentions to test.”). This framework also applies to IRBR informed consent because in “the context of a
biorepository . . . participants may be enrolled based simply on their membership in a particular population . . . and not because they have a particular
condition of interest.” Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 99. “Specimens and
data are stored for future, unspecified use in a variety of studies that typically
take place without the subject’s direct knowledge or consent.” Id. Thus, when
researchers are providing informed consent in contexts that may generate
IRBRs, they often must use the equivalent of hypothetical scenarios what the
research may reveal and the very tests the specimen will be used for are unknown.
142. See Persky, supra note 141, at 727 (“Hypothetical scenario methodology is commonly employed in the study of genetic susceptibility testing uptake
estimation. The methodology, however, has not been rigorously assessed and
sizeable gaps exist between estimated and actual uptake for tests that have
recently become available.”).
143. Id. at 728.
144. See generally id. (discussing only generally how hypothetical scenario
methodology could be improved without discussing any implication these improvements could have for the informed consent process).
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Nearly two decades ago, the proposal of generic consent for
genetic screening anticipated this problem of needing to make a
decision about whether to receive genomic information in a context of substantial uncertainty about the nature of the information and implications of receiving it.145 Unfortunately, generic consent does not provide a good solution.146 Selection of
the results or the type of results one would want to receive from
research with biorepositories is daunting and probably not a
good bargain to make with the future. Pleiotropy makes it impossible, for example, to elect to learn about risks for cardiovascular conditions, but to refuse risk information regarding future cognitive impairment, because already the pleiotropy of
the APOε4 allele is known. But many similar associations of a
specific genetic variation with multiple conditions remain to be
discovered and reported, or not. How can one meaningfully
choose? How should one factor into the decision that additional
associated conditions may be discovered in the future? Of
course, in clinical care informed consent decisions are at best
substantially informed and never fully so. Yet, most clinical interventions are more immediate and time limited.147 Consent to
clinical interventions is less of a blank check. Most importantly,
the potential benefits of a clinical intervention are often wellcharacterized, even if they do not all eventuate. Admittedly, the
risks of actual clinical interventions are frequently greater
than those of merely receiving genomic information.148 If, how-

145. E.g., Sherman Elias & George J. Annas, Generic Consent for Genetic
Screening, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1611, 1611 (1994).
146. E.g., Leslie G. Biesecker & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Letter to the Editor,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED., 1024 (1994) (“A generic-consent model would draw patients into the prenatal testing process with an incomplete understanding of
what is involved. This policy would have the undesirable effect of diminishing
the opportunity to decline testing, which may be the best option for some patients.”).
147. See also Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 101 (“Approximately
30% of interviewees made comments about research relative to medical care. .
. . Almost all described differences between the two, noting for example that
research was ‘not like a regular doctor visit’ where one would expect diagnosis,
treatment, and followup. Some specifically noted a difference between a biological sample that could ‘sit on a shelf with a million others’ and individual medical care, although a few felt that a personal connection remained between a
biospecimen and the individual from whom it came.”) (internal reference omitted) (emphasis omitted).
148. See, e.g., Henrikson, Bowen & Burke, supra note 108, at 37.2 (“It is
also unclear whether most behavioral interventions can or should be individualized for people at moderately increased risk of disease. Aggressive prevention measures, such as prophylactic surgery, would be ethically and socially
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ever, one considers that undertaking health behaviors or clinical interventions in light of the genomic information is part of a
package deal of receiving genomic information, then the ratio of
risks and potential benefits shifts once again.
A third problem with trying to use an individual’s preferences to manage any IRBRs discovered about her is that an individual’s preferences are frequently inconsistent and change
over time.149 Moreover, the circumstances that influenced or
competed with those earlier preferences change over time, as do
the beliefs that influenced them.150 The person who expressed a
preference for learning an IRBR because she would want to inform her offspring of any significant health risk may find herself without children. A person who wanted to learn his/her
health-related IRBRs to motivate preventive health behaviors
may still highly value health and prevention, but be preoccupied with a health concern unrelated to the IRBR. It may be
said that these are simply reasons for embracing a policy that
establishes a two-step process: first asking (during informed
consent ) whether one would want to be offered an IRBR upon
its discovery, and then later asking whether one, in fact, wants
to receive the IRBR that is discovered. But this two-step process does not address the problem of an individual’s lacking adequate information to make an informed decision about whether she wants to know what she does not yet know.151
unacceptable for people with moderately increased risk, whereas many behaviors, such as smoking cessation and regular exercise, reduce risk for many diseases at all levels of risk.”).
149. See, e.g., Hausman, supra note 59, at 9 (“As comparative evaluations,
preferences are subject to criticism and discussion. Even preferences that
seem like mere comparative likings can be criticized and rationally reconsidered. For example, even though Jack likes cheesecake a great deal more than
he likes sorbet, his preferences among those desserts may change radically
after a mild stroke coupled with a stern warning from his doctor about his cholesterol level.”).
150. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“The most fundamental difficulty with actual revealed-preference theory (which also bears on hypothetical revealedpreference theory) is that an agent’s preferences influence her choices only via
the agent’s beliefs. Keep her preferences constant and change her beliefs, and
her choices may change. There is no one-to-one relation between preference
and choice. Preferences can be inferred from choices only given knowledge of
beliefs.”).
151. See McGuire & Gibbs, supra note 136, at 371 (“Some of the practical
challenges [with stratified consent procedures] include providing adequate
disclosure and education about a complex risk calculus, ensuring subject comprehension, coordinating a system of restricted access, and managing a com-
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F. SHOULD PREFERENCES PLAY ANY ROLE IN OFFERING AND
RETURNING IRBRS?
In short, yes. Abiding by the enrollee’s manifest preference—the choice made during the informed consent process for
biobank participation—is ethically appropriate, but not as a
matter of fact about preferences with the goal of their satisfaction. It is ethically appropriate as a matter of respecting the
right of a competent person to make a research or healthrelated decision to refuse or accept options being offered. Respecting an enrollee’s choice is warranted by the norms governing research, informed consent, and health-related decision
making, not by alleged facts about people’s preferences or the
effect of preference satisfaction on research enrollment.152
If an individual has been asked, as part of the informed
consent process, and has responded that she wants to be offered
IRBRs, her choice should be respected. Whatever her preference (qua comparative evaluation) with respect to receiving the
results may be, she has made it known that she wishes to be
offered the opportunity to make such a choice. In like manner,
if upon being offered a specific IRBR, an individual chooses to
receive it, again that choice should be honored. Why should investigators honor it? First, although the consent context suffers
from the problems plaguing choice in hypothetical contexts, at
least the notion of preference is coherent: an individual can
form and express her own preference qua comparative evaluation. Second, the informed consent decisions of putatively competent individuals are to be respected, as are their other decisions made in response to provisions of an ethically approved
research protocol. Third, the individual’s preference qua choice
should be respected, in short, because she was asked. The investigator or biorepository created the context in which the contributor was asked to make a comparative evaluation and to
express a decision. The investigator or biorepository created
expectations on the part of the participant that it would be disrespectful not to endeavor to fulfill. If outside of the context of
informed consent, the participant were asked—by the investigator, not just in casual conversation with her friends—her
preference about being offered IRBRs, this reason for respecting her preference might still apply. The creation of justified

plex database that accounts for subjects’ informed disclosure preferences.”).
152. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal.
1990).
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expectations through the interaction, not her having and expressing the preference, is ethically critical.
IV. THREE NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS INFORMED BY
THE FACTS
In the preceding pages, this inquiry has provided reasons
to be at least skeptical and cautious about turning to people’s
preferences regarding return of IRBRs to motivate, justify, or
inform policies to manage IRBRs. In this final section I want to
turn from alleged facts about people’s preferences to some normative considerations about returning results. The literature in
this regard is large and growing, as is this paper.153 For those
reasons, I limit myself to three points.
First, let us begin with interests and well-being, as research regulations concerning human subjects are designed to
protect participants’ well-being, though not to promote individual interests.154 Instead, research promotes social interests, adequately constrained by protecting individuals’ welfare and respecting persons.155 I believe one reason that the assessment
and incorporation of people’s preferences into policies regarding
IRBRs has seemed so attractive is that we tend to believe that
people’s preferences guide us toward what people value, which
in turn provides guidance toward at least their own conceptions
of their well-being. If only we could rely on peoples’ preferences,
we would not need to inquire directly, and perhaps paternalistically, into their interests. But, paternalistic understanding of
individuals’ well-being can be justified in the context of research, even genomic research.156
153. Within this literature I find myself in greatest sympathy with the
normative arguments of Laura Beskow, Ellen Wright Clayton, and Pilar
Ossorio. See, e.g., Beskow & Smolek, supra note 14, at 108–09; Clayton &
McGuire, supra note 107, at 1–2; Pilar N. Ossorio, Letting the Gene out of the
Bottle: A Comment on Returning Individual Research Results to Participants,
AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 24, 24–25. On empirical points relevant
to these normative arguments, I am persuaded by considerations raised by
Fiona Miller and her co-authors. See, e.g., F. A. Miller et al., Duty to Disclose
What? Querying the Putative Obligation to Return Research Results to Participants, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 210, 210–11 (2008).
154. E.g., Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Facing Up to Paternalism in Research Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2007, at 24, 24
(“The reigning regulatory and ethical frameworks for human research emphasize the protection of research subjects.”).
155. See id. at 28–30.
156. Id.
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Perhaps even more important in this case, research is a
context in which we can justify promoting social interests (e.g.,
by demanding the comparative effectiveness of health-related—
and frequently, publicly funded—interventions and reserving
research funds for the pursuit of research) even when this involves limiting individuals’ access to what they want.157 Such
limitation seems especially justified when what people want is
not clearly in their interests, or is occasioned by an apparent
psychological disposition that leads people to want their personal genomic information largely because someone else knows
it.158 Social interest in the progress of research may justify not
supplying individual benefit (e.g., information that would actually contribute to an individual’s well-being).159 It may justify
granting less weight to individuals’ interests in control per se
than in their interest in protecting their person or various material interests they have.160 Eventually, if all goes well, the information that is now the content of genomic research results,
aggregate and individual, will inform individuals’ clinical care.
The topic of returning IRBRs of biorepository research will become an issue of the past, because the reliable and significant
results will not only inform clinical care, but also individuals’
access to that personal information will be part of a health care
infrastructure grounded in science and guided by results of
comparative effectiveness research.
Second, two related reasons frequently offered in support
of offering IRBRs back to biorepository contributors are respect
for persons and reciprocity.161 Respect for persons demands not
treating contributors to research solely as means to an end.162
157. Id. at 29 (“Because prospective subjects are rarely in a position to assess either the social or scientific value of a research protocol or the validity of
its research methods, IRBs are given that charge in their stead.”).
158. See id. at 24.
159. Failure to benefit research participants is not the same as harming
them. If failure to benefit were to become a prevalent understanding of
“harm,” then IRBs’ assessment of probable harm-to-benefit ratios and the appropriateness of various research designs would need to be revised in myriad
contexts.
160. Id. at 33 (“There is a tendency to see informed consent as being motivated solely by the value of the agent’s autonomy, as contrasted with the
agent’s welfare or interests. This is a mistake. After all, people want to be in
control of their lives not just to protect some abstract value of noninterference
or to keep themselves from being treated merely as a means, but also to protect their interests from those who would harm them.”).
161. F. A. Miller et al., supra note 153, at 210.
162. Id.
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The duty to respect participants as persons requires respecting
their informed refusal of participation and honoring their other
choices during informed consent (and throughout the research).
It involves treating them with respect, not satisfying their preferences. Failure to offer individualized results does not treat
subjects solely as a means to the scientific end of obtaining
generalizable data. Further, treating participants with respect
may involve recognizing their contributions (where doing so
would not violate confidentiality or impose group harms) and
providing them with aggregate study results in terms they can
understand; it certainly involves interacting with them respectfully.163
Giving participants the IRRs they want is advocated as a
matter of reciprocity.164 The results are regarded as a “thank
you” gift or compensation for study participation, or a reward
for altruism.165 I disagree with this approach. If study participants and biorepository contributors are to be compensated,
that compensation should be given to all of them. Being compensated or thanked for participation should not depend on
one’s particular genome (giving rise to an IRR/IRBR). If offering a benefit is necessary to compensate, evidence respect, or
avoid exploiting subjects, then the benefit should not be of uncertain scientific or personal value; it should not depend on the
individuals’ social circumstances and personal ability to translate it into something of value (e.g., clinical interventions or
positive behavioral change). Out of fairness, the benefit should
be of established and of relatively uniform value to all subjects
(e.g., money in exchange for inconvenience or a gift certificate
for something everyone uses).
A final point about fairness is the third normative consideration I want to raise. Fairness dictates that individual benefit
from research participation should not depend on one’s genome
or other individual characteristics, but should be given to all
who contribute. Obviously, the possibility of receiving an IRBR
depends partly on one’s own genome. It also depends partly on
the research questions and procedures pursued, as well as on
the other people and genomes accrued into in the biorepository
or genomic study, because discovery of patterns of genetic vari-

163. Ossorio, supra note 153, at 24.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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ation is critical to discovering genotype-phenotype associations.166 Currently, a substantial amount of pharmacogenomic
research, for example, relies upon the fact that genetic variations associated with different drug responses occur in varying
frequencies in different continental ancestry groups.167 Substantially unequal representation from different continental
ancestry groups, inadequate representation from some groups,
or the failure to ask research questions relevant to particular
groups or individuals with particular patterns of genetic variation can all limit the likelihood of identifying a reliable finding
relevant to particular continental ancestry groups. Genetic variations common to particular ancestry groups must be sufficiently well-characterized to ground accurate and clinically
meaningful interpretation. Such characterization must be undertaken through initiation of studies. However, to cite a prominent pharmacogenomic example, to date, fewer studies of drug
response associated with the CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 genes,
which are associated with the metabolism of at least fifty
drugs, have been undertaken in African Americans and Hispanics than in Whites and Asians.168 The potential for such
disparities in the likelihood of research participation revealing
an individual genomic result of some value suggests that return
of IRBRs is not a suitable form of compensation or gratitude for
research participation.
CONCLUSION
Factual information is obviously relevant to normative
considerations of fairness, what is respectful, what is a suitable
“than you” gift, and what contributes to individuals’ well-being.
As a whole, this inquiry has sought to shift attention away
from facts about preferences—especially the incoherent notion
of “people’s preferences,” but also individual’s preferences. It
166. See Cho, supra note 133, at 282.
167. Geography has influenced mating and migration patterns across centuries, with the result that people who have a specific continental ancestry
(e.g., Asian or African) exhibit frequencies of genetic variation that differ from
those with a different continental ancestry. Members of different ancestry
groups exhibit slightly more genetic difference from each other than from other members of the same continental ancestry population. E.g., Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Beyond Race: Towards a Whole-Genome Perspective
on Human Populations and Genetic Variations, 5 NATURE REV. GENETICS 790,
passim (2004).
168. N. Poolsup et al., Pharmacogenetics and Psychopharmacotherapy, 25
J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 197, 201, 206 (2000).
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has instead advocated direct examination of what can improve
individuals’ health, which social circumstances impede adoption of disease prevention behaviors, and which false beliefs
and expectations need to be corrected to enable incorporation of
genomic information into clinical care. It has suggested that
facts regarding the comparative effectiveness of various interventions inform normative arguments regarding fairness, harm
avoidance, and benefit in health and research policies. Facts
have important roles to play in policies, though facts about
people’s preferences do not.

